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Abstract
We review the current status of the αη direct encryption protocol.
After describing αη, we summarize the main security claims made on
it. We then describe recent attacks developed against it in the litera-
ture, and suggest security enhancements and future research directions
based on our results.
1 Introduction
This article summarizes a poster presentation at QCMC 2006 on the security
of the αη protocol. The αη protocol [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] was developed as an effi-
cient (the ‘η’ in αη) quantum encryption protocol using coherent states (‘α’).
Its objective being direct data encryption, it is inappropriate to compare it
with quantum cryptographic protocols for key generation, such as BB84,
continuous-variable QKD, and entanglement-based QKD protocols. First of
all, αη uses a pre-shared secret key (typically a few thousand bits long) that
is not assumed in key generation protocols (except for a short authentication
key). Secondly, the criterion of success of an encryption protocol is not so
stringent as in a key generation protocol, where one ideally desires to distill
bits that are nearly random to Eve. For the first reason given above, it is
also inappropriate to compare αη to a composite protocol in which , e.g.,
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BB84 is used to generate nearly random keys which are subsequently used
for data encryption through, e.g., one-time pad. On the other hand, from a
cryptographic standpoint, one can make a fair comparison between αη and
a standard classical encryption protocol like one-time pad or AES since the
cryptographic objective is the same in both cases. Unfortunately, to our
knowledge, there is no universally agreed upon security criterion for stan-
dard encryption which can be calculated for any meaningful standard cipher
(excluding one-time pad). Thus, security claims are usually made given cer-
tain unproved assumptions and in some cases these assumptions have only
sociological support. Given this situation, we will take care to state all the
assumptions made for our claims in the rest of this article.
2 The αη cryptosystem
We now describe the steps of operation of an αη cryptosystem as depicted
in Fig. 1:
(1) Alice and Bob share a secret key K.
(2) Using a key expansion function ENC(·), e.g., a linear feedback shift
register or AES in stream cipher mode, the seed key K is expanded into a
running key sequence that is chopped into n blocks: KMn = ENC(K) =
(K1, . . . , Kmn). Here, m = log2(M), so that Zi ≡ (K(i−1)m+1, . . . , Kim)
can take M values. The Zi constitute the keystream.
(3) For each bit Xi of the plaintext sequence Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn), Alice
transmits the coherent state
|ψ(Xi, Zi)〉 = |αeiθ(Xi,Zi)〉. (1)
Here, α ∈ R and θ(Xi, Zi) takes values in the set {0, pi/M, . . . , (2M −
1)pi/M}. The function θ taking the data bit and keystream symbol
to the actual angle on the coherent state circle is called the mapper.
In this article, we assume that θ(Xi, Zi) = [Zi/M + (Xi ⊕ Pol(Zi))]pi.
Pol(Zi) = 0 or 1 according to whether Zi is even or odd. Thus Ki can be
thought of as choosing a ‘basis’ with the states representing bits 0 and 1
as its end points.
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(4) In order to decrypt, Bob runs an identical ENC function on his copy of
the seed key. For each i, knowing Zi, he makes a quantum measurement
to discriminate the two states |ψ(0, Zi)〉 and |ψ(1, Zi)〉 and recover the
input bit.
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Figure 1: Left – Overall schematic of the αη encryption system. Right –
Depiction of two of M bases with interleaved logical bit mappings.
3 Security Claims
We list in this section our theoretical claims regarding αη, leaving a discussion
of some attacks on it to the next section.
1. Random Cipher Character : First, we claim [3, 4, 5] that the funda-
mental performance of αη is equivalent to that of a corresponding clas-
sical random cipher when Eve makes individual identical heterodyne
or phase measurements on each optical qumode. A random cipher dif-
fers from a non-random one in associating more than one ciphertext
to every plaintext-key pair. For known-plaintext attack on the key,
we have defined in [3] a parameter Γ that is a measure of the number
of running keys that can be associated to a given plaintext-ciphertext
symbol pair, which we expect to be, at least qualitatively, relevant to
security. Under heterodyne attack, we estimate Γ ∼ M/(pi√S) for
signal energy S. This number works out to around 3 for the typical
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parameters M ∼ 2000, S ∼ 40000 used in [4]. Further details on the
above, including why random ciphers are theoretically interesting from
a security standpoint, can be found in [3].
2. Assisted Brute-Force Search Complexity : One may easily see that a
heterodyne measurement by Eve on each qumode i gives her partial
information on the keystream symbol Zi, especially the most significant
bits of Zi for the mapping scheme of the previous section. In our so-
called ‘wedge approximation’ [3], she may thus tabulate the possible
keystream sequences given her measurement for each i. We define in
[3] an assisted brute-force search attack on the key to be an attack where
Eve exhaustively checks (using any algorithm) for a seed key that is
compatible with one of the keystream combinations. The factor by
which her complexity increases we call the assisted brute-force search
complexity. For example, when the ENC box is an LFSR, we show that
it equals C = Γ|K|/ log2M .
3. Ciphertext-Only Attack Security with DSR: In [6], we detail a technique
called Deliberate Signal Randomization (DSR) involving a randomiza-
tion of the state in Eq. (1) by Alice before transmission with the pur-
pose of rendering the seed key inaccessible to Eve in a ciphertext-only
attack, i.e., an attack where each data bit is independently completely
random. We show therein that DSR may be done in principle, namely
in the limit S,M → ∞,M/√S = piΓ, at the same time preserving
the Γ that Eve sees for mode-by-mode measurements and increasing
Bob’s decoding error probability using the same decoding apparatus
by an arbitrarily small amount. This result demonstrates that αη can
in principle approach similar security under ciphertext-only attacks as
that obtained from standard stream ciphers [5], even if joint quantum
attacks are made.
4 Recent Attacks on αη
In this section, we comment on some recent attacks on αη made by the
Donnet group in [7] and by ourselves. Earlier attacks by Lo and Ko and by
the Nishioka group have been addressed by us in detail in the papers [5] and
[3] respectively.
4
4.1 Correlation Attacks
Donnet et al describe in [7] an attack based on the viewpoint that the seed
key is presented to Eve making heterodyne measurements in a coded, i.e.,
redundant, form with noise on top. For the LFSR case, a linear decoding
algorithm may thus be employed to retrieve the seed key from observations.
While the efficacy of such an attack for |K| = 32 has been demonstrated,
we have commented in [6] that the linear decoding approach is exponentially
complex with respect to the key size and the number of LFSR taps, both of
which can be increased to make such attacks impossibly complex. We also
mentioned some security measures that break the linear code structure and
render linear decoding algorithms ineffective. We also showed how αη with
an ENC using a parallel configuration of AES boxes can be used to provide
more security than a single AES box.
4.2 Joint Attack on αη: Preliminary Results
All the preceding results, except the one on DSR, are concerned with attacks
where Eve makes identical mode-by-mode quantum measurements. Although
impractical at present, her most general attack is a joint measurement of the
entire qumode sequence. For the case of known-plaintext attack on the key,
with the conservative assumption that Eve is given a full copy of the trans-
mitted quantum state, the relevant quantity is her average error probability
P e of discriminating the |K| states given by products of states of the form of
Eq. (1) for a given plaintext sequence x. In [8], we developed a new general
technique of upper-bounding P e. Applying it to αη with LFSR as the ENC
box, and for the parameters mentioned above and |K| = 4000 bits, we find
that Eve’s error probability becomes completely negligible for data length
n in the range of 10-100 Mbits. Since this is based on an upper bound,
the system could in fact be insecure for smaller n. This result is not too
surprising, as non-random ‘nondegenerate’ ciphers are also broken at their
nondegeneracy distance [3, 5], which is believed to be quite small.
5 Conclusion
The insecurity of the bare αη under joint attack implies that the random ci-
pher character of αη is not sufficient to provide a significant level of information-
theoretic security. However, the system would still have great practical value
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if it possessed a high, e.g., exponential level of complexity-based security.
Thus, it seems that the study of complexity-based security of random ci-
phers, and of quantitative security measures in general, is important.
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